What is the role of tugs when assisting vessels in berthing and unberthing? If they notice an emergency situation developing, should they act on their own despite the presence of a pilot onboard the vessel, and can they be held liable for any failure to act? This question came up in The Aframax River [2023].
The tanker was unberthing in the port of Houston with two tugs made fast, one on the port bow and the other on the port quarter. Shortly after the command for 'dead slow astern' was given, the RPM increased from 30 to 80 (emergency full astern) due to a failure in the PCB of the main engine governor system. The Master was unaware of this. This led to a collision with the dolphins six minutes later, resulting in a ruptured fuel tank and a subsequent fire. The owners believed that the tugs breached their duty of care during those six minutes by not intervening and being improperly positioned, and therefore should contribute to the damage caused.
The US District Court found that the tugs were not under any duty to offer their opinions to the pilot or to intervene, even when there was a risk of allision. They were also not required to alert the vessel that her speed was too fast. The effectiveness of the tugs was anyways reduced (by about 70%) as the vessel was making a sternway at 3.7 knots. Regarding their positioning, it was the pilot’s decision, and they were actually positioned where the ‘tug’ marks were on the vessel’s hull. The vessel was solely to blame for this incident. The malfunction of the governor system rendered the vessel unseaworthy. The manufacturer had recommended replacing the PCBs after a certain period, but this was not done as it was not included in the vessel’s PMS. The Court also highlighted various provisions of COLREGS that the vessel violated:
Rule 6 (Unsafe speed. Sternway of 3.7 knots was deemed unsafe for various reasons, one of which was the max allowed speed as mentioned on the pilot card and agreed during MPX was 2 knots)
Rule 7 (not appreciating risk of allision after ME failed), and
Rule 8 (3/O not informing the Master that RPM had reached 80, not stopping engine using emergency stop, engine crew not taking control of the engine after noticing an abnormal situation, and not dropping anchor earlier).
Link to the judgement: https://casetext.com/case/intercontinental-terminal-corp-v-aframax-river-marine-co-3
Link to NTSB's investigation report: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAB1806.pdf
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